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STOCKSTILL v. PETTY RAY

(Cont.)

a notice of appeal from the dismissal of its claim against B&B.
B&B did not file a notice of appeal from the dimissal of its claim
against BMF.
BMF contends that B&B may not appeal this determination
because it failed to file a notice of appeal and that Geosource has
no standing to appeal this dismissal because it never filed a claun
against BMF.
( 1J Is B&B liable to Geosource?
<2J May appellate jurisdiction be exercised over the
against BMF?

ISSUES:
clai lT:

ANALYSIS: The District Court relied upon Lanasse v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971) in dismtssing Geosource's
claim against B&B. Geosource's claim was based upon the fact
that it would have been covered, had B&B ir.cluded Geosource
as an additional insured on B&B's P&I policy, as agreed. The
Lanasse case stated that a charterer could be covered by an
owner's P&I policy if (1) the accident was caused by a vessel or
its crew and (2) liability flowed from the insured's status as
vessel owner. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, found,
contrary to the district court, that Stockstill and Sandidge were
crew members of the BB-300. In fact, the parties stipulated that
Stockstill was a member of the crew of the 11eet of vessels which
included the barge. Geosource also passes the second requirment

because, as a demise or bareboat charterer, it may be considered
a vessel "owner" for the purposes of P&I coverage.
Since B&B breached its agreement to have its P&I insurance
endorsed to name Goesource as an additional insured it must
provide such coverage to Geosource.
The Court of Appeals rejected B&B's contention, relying on
Anthony v. Petroleum Helecoptors, Inc., 693 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1982) and Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 \9th
Cir. 1981), that an initial notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P.
\ 4)(a)( 1 J is mandatory and jurisdictional but a notice of protec
tive or cross-appeal under Rule \4HaH3J is permissive and
courts of appeal may retain all parties in order to do justice.
The Court stated that it is questionable whether Anthony or
Bryant remains good law in light of Torres v. Oakland Scavenger
Co., 487 U.S.
108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 \ 1988J which
held that the requirments of Rules 3 and 4 are mandatory and
jurisdictional and that although the courts of appeal may liberally
construe those rules to determine whether they have been complied
with, the courts may not waive non-compliance.
The Court held, that even if Anthony or Bryant is good law,
the present case does not fall within the exception. The exception
is only available when the appealed decision could be read as not
being adverse to the party who failed to file timely notice of
appeal. B&B may not take advantage of this exception because
the dismissal of its claim was clearly adverse to it.
_,
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FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LAKE SHORE INC.
United States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit, 20 September1989
886F.2 d 654
Where defendant does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to justify the exercise of personal.
jurisdiction, neither a general "stream of commerce" theory nor the unique nature of ocean-going vessels will support the
exercise of personal jurisditction.
FACTS: In April of 1985, General Electric Company <GEl
shipped a turbine accessory base aboard the M/V Paul Bunyon.
While the base was being loaded aboard the vessel a cargo winch
allegedly malfunctioned causing the base to fall and become
damaged. At the time of the accident the vessel was docked in
Charleston, South Carolina. Under its contract of insurance,
Federal Insurance Company <Federal) paid GE $322,543.46 fi>r
the damaged base. Plaintiff-appellant, Federal, a New Jersey
Corporation, thus became entitled to the subrogated claim of GE.
The M/V Paul Bunyon was designed and manufactured by
defendant-appellee Peterson Builders Inc. <Peterson), a
Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, engaged in the design and manufacture
of ocean-going vessels. Defendant-appellee, Lake Shore Inc.
<Lake Shore), is a Michigan corporation engaged in the design,
manufacture, and sale of cargo winches, with its principal place
of business in Iron Mountain, Michigan.
The Lake Shore cargo winch installed on the M/V Paul Bunyon
was manufactured in Michigan and the vessel was designed and
manufactured in Wisconsin for American Heavy Lift Shipping
Company <AHL), a Delaware corporation. The contract of sale
between Peterson and AHL was executed in Wisconsin and
Pennsylvania. AHL accepted delivery of the vessel in
Wisconsin.
In March of 1988, Federal filed suit against Peterson, Lake
Shore and American Ship Management <American) in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina, involving
the court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. American is a
Delaware Corporation that hired the vessel's crew and handled
the vessel's insurance needs. Federal sought to recover the
$322,543.46 paid to GE plus interest and costs, for causes of action
including: negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and
implied warranties. Peterson and Lake Shore entered special
appearances and moved to dismiss for lack of in personam
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jurisdiction. American moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the
Defendants and granted Federal's and Lake Shore's motion to
dismiss and American's motion for summary judgment.
Federal appealed the district court's grant of Lake Shore's
and Peterson's motion to dismiss.
Lake Shore and Peterson do not maintain offices in South
Carolina and are not licensed to do business in that state.
Neither has agents, employees or subsidiaries in South Carolina
and neither maintains a bank account or owns real or personal
property in the state. Also, all of Lake Shore's products and
materials sold to South Carolina residents have been shipped
F.O.B. Michigan.
ISSUES: 1J Do defendants have sufficient "minimum con
tacts" with South Carolina such that the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction would not offend the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" embodied in the constitutional principles
of due process?
2) In the absence of such "minimum contacts" will a
general stream of commerce theory or the unique nature of ocean
going vessels support the exercise of personal jurisdiction?
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit,
affirmed the district court's finding that defendants lacked suf
ficient "minimum contacts" with South Carolina to be amenable
to suit there. The court also held that without such contacts
neither the nature of ocean-going vessels nor a stream of com
merce theory supported the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over defendants.
The court noted that Congress had not authorized nation
wide service of process in admiralty cases so that South
Carolina's long-arm statute (construed to extend jurisdiction "to
(continues...)

FED. INS. v. LAKE SHORE
(Cont.)
the outer limits" of due process, Triplett v. R.M. Wade& Co., 261
S.C. 419 (1973)) had to be applied to determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction met the requirements of due
process. The Court noted that, "the constitutional touchstone
remains whether the defendant purposefully established
'minimum contacts' in the forum," Burger King v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 467, 474 (1985) "such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' " International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
Under the facts, the Court found that the defendant's contact
with the forum state did not suggest a purposefulness, and thus
personal jurisdiction could not be asserted without offending
notions of due process.
The court also rejected Federal's argument that defendants
were subject to South Carolina's personal jurisdiction under a
stream of commerce theory. Citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1986), the Court noted that factors
such as marketing and advertising by defendants in the forum
state which might make a stream of commerce theory applicable
were lacking. Moreover, in this case, defendants' products were
transported into the forum by a consumer. To allow the state to
use this as a means of exercising personal jurisdiction over
defendants would effectively mean that, "amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980). Also, this case did not
involve multiple deliveries of units into South Carolina over a
period of years. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122. Though the court did not
reject out of hand a stream of commerce theory, such a theory
clearly did not apply in this case.

Finally, the court rejected Federal's assertion that the nature
of an ocean-going vessel (designed and manufactured) to go
from port to port is such that it sustains the exercise of personal
juridsiction. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had already
rejected such an argument in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 296 n.11, the court added that all products are mobile to some
extent and a product-by-product approach tb personal jurisdiction
would succeed only in drawing courts into an arcane and litigi
ous search for meaningless distinctions. Thus, the question to
ask in assessing whether personal jurisdiction can properly be
asserted is not as to the nature of the product, but the nature of
the defendants' contacts with the forum state.
Upon these findings, the Court held that it would not be
reasonable for personal jurisdiction to be asserted over defendants,
that this was sufficient independent grounds for dismissal. In
support of this conclusion, the court noted certain factors that
should be considered in determining whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction offends due process requirements. The
court included among the factors; the defendant's burden in
litigating in the forum, the forum state's interest, the plaintiffs
interest in obtaining relief in the forum, the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies and the shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental social policies. In this case, the court
found that the defendant's contacts with the state of South
Carolina are insufficient to warrant the proper assertion of
personal jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the court affirmed
the district court judgment granting defendants' motion to dis
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO. v. L & L MARINE SERVICE INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, 6 July1989
87 5F.2 d1351
Negligence by the operators of a vessel does not act to supervene the owners absolute duty to provide a seaworthy vessel
for the voyage intended. All the resulting damages will be allocated by the comparative degree of fault of the parties. The
work by a tug of pulling the vessel off a shoal is properly classified as towage rather than salvage.
FACTS: The barge Apex Chicago and the tug Maya went aground
off the coast of Massachusetts on October 19, 1981, while en
route from Carteret, New Jersey to Boston, Massachusetts. The
crew of the tug were employees of L & L Marine Service (L&LJ,
which operated the barge and tug under an agreement with
Apex Towing (Apex). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) had issued small craft advisories along
the route and upgraded them to gale warnings by 6:00 PM on
October 18th. Instead of heeding the warnings, the Maya left
the protected waters of Long Island Sound and proceeded into
the open waters of Block Island Sound and Rhode Island Sound.
While in Rhode Island Sound early on the morning of October
19th, severe weather was encountered, consisting of winds up to
35 knots, squalls, zero visibility and ten foot seas. During this
rough leg of the voyage, the towing cable parted. Due to the
intensity of the storm, the crew did not realize that the barge
had come adrift for thirty minutes. Expert testimony showed
that the breaking strength of the tow cable was significantly
lower than that required by industry standards. This problem
was exacerbated by the fact that the crew could not let out more
cable to reduce the stress. The cable could not be slacked, because
the winch had an antiquated manual release mechanism that
was dangerous to operate in rough weather. By the tme the crew
of the Maya sighted the barge Apex Chicago, she was aground
on the Hen and Chicken Shoals, leaking gasoline through a
gash in her hull. While attempting to pull the barge from the
rocks, the tug further damaged the barge before going aground.
The stranded tug and barge were freed when aU.S. Coast Guard
vessel and two private tugs, the Chicopee and the Jaguar, arrived.
The Jaguar pulled the Maya free with a floating hawser that
had been connected by Coast Guard personnel; the Maya pulled
the Apex Chicago free, and then the Jaguar and the Chicopee

towed the two vessels to port where the cargo was lightered. In
the aftermath of the accident, American Home Assurance Co.
(American) paid several sizable claims to, or on behalf of, Apex
Oil Company (Apex Oil). These claims included one by the
Jaguar for "salavage" of the Maya. As a subrogee of Apex Oil,
American brought an action against L&L to recover the damages
resulting from the accident, which American alleges were prox
imately caused by the negligent operation of the Maya by L&L's
crew. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Missouri, awarded judgment to American for one half of the
sum of provable damages based on the comparative degree of
fault of the parties. American appealed the decision.
ISSUES: 1) Is the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel qualified
by an assumption that the crew will navigate the vessel out of
harm's way?
2) Was the allocation of damages according to the
comparative degree of fault proper?
3) Was the Jaguar's pulling of the Maya off the
shoals properly classified as "salvage" or "towage"?
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Eight Circuit, affirm
ing in part and vacating in part, held that the duty of the owner
to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute. This absolute duty is
not qualified by an assumption that the crew will navigate the
vessel out of harm's way and is defined by the vessel's intended
voyage, the hazards likely to be encountered and the vessel's
·
ability to withstand these hazards. The measure of a vessel's
seaworthiness is not a function of her crew's skill and foresight
in navigation. The behavior of L&L's crew was negligent, but
the substantially understrength cable and obsolete stern winch
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